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COMMENTS
EFFECT OF CLAUSE IN LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUD-
ING COVERAGE FOR CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY LIABILITY
To what extent is an insurance company responsible on a liability policy
containing a clause excluding coverage in instances where the insured has
assumed by contract loss or liability which may be incurred by a third party?
This problem arises when the insured enters into a contract of indemnity with
a third party. The typical exclusion clause in a liability insurance policy reads:
"This policy does not apply to liability assumed by the insured under any con-
tract or agreement not defined herein."' The problem has two aspects, one
economic and the other legal. A greater premium is invariably charged for
contractual liability coverage. 2 As to its legal aspects there is a dearth of de-
cisional authority defining the precise meaning and effect of a clause in a general
liability policy excluding contractual liability coverage. It is the object of this
comment to analyze in the light of the law of indemnity the meaning of the
term "contractual liability," and determine, with the aid of the comparatively
few cases that have considered the problem, the circumstances under which a
clause excluding contractual indemnity coverage may be properly operative.
TYPES OF INDEMNITY CONTRACTS
To understand clearly the nature of the problem presented by clauses ex-
cluding liability assumed by contract, it is necessary to distinguish the types
of indemnity agreements. Generally an indemnity contract is either express,
i.e., consensual, or it may be implied in law.8 Express indemnity contracts can
be conveniently categorized as either sweeping in nature or imposing a limited
obligation on the indemnitor. Under the former the indemnitor may contract
to save the indemnitee harmless from any liability or loss which the latter
may suffer regardless of the indemnitee's own negligence. By reason of such
an agreement the indemnitee will be reimbursed even though his own negli-
gence was the sole cause of the injury.4 Under the limited indemnity contract
the indemnitor protects the indemnitee from liability resulting from the in-
demnitor's negligence. Here the parties are merely expressing contractually a
liability which the law itself generally imposes, because where both the indemni-
tor and the indemnitee were negligent, if the indemnitee was merely passively
1. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Virginia Engineering Co., 213 F.2d 109, 111
(4th Cir. 1954).
2. See American Stevedores, Inc. v. American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 138 N.Y.S.2d 513
(Sup. Ct. 1955), where coverage for liability assumed by contract was endorsed on the
policy.
3. See, Meriam and Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasors: An Evolving Doctrine
in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 845, n.2 (1950); 42 C.J.S., Indemnity
§§ 4, 20 (1944).
4. The intention to save an indemnitee harmless from his own negligence must be un-
equivocally expressed in the contract of indemnity. Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator
Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936).
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negligent, he will recover from the actively negligent indemnitor.5 This recovery
is based upon quasi-contractual principles. The passive-active negligence rule
is, therefore, the root and essence of recovery where there is a limited in-
demnity contract or no express indemnity agreement.0 A recent New York
Court of Appeals case has dispelled the notion that to be "passively" negligent
for indemnity purposes one has to be inactive or omissive, and to be actively
negligent it is necessary to do affirmative, harmful acts or be commissive in
conduct.7 histead the decision indicates that the terms are merely a guide in
determining which of several wrongdoers was more responsible for an injury.
Considering the types of indemnity contract in relation to the effect of a con-
tractual liability exclusion clause, it is submitted that where the insured becomes
liable for a third party's negligence by reason of a sweeping type indemnity
agreement the exclusion clause is operative to preclude coverage under the
policy.8 This conclusion is consistent not only with the express provision of the
contract of insurance, but also with the principles of substantial justice in that
the insured under an ordinary liability policy has not paid a premium that was
computed with the negligence of another person in mind.
However, the question may be asked, should an exclusion clause be operative
in a situation where the insured would have been liable regardless of his con-
tractual promises, as an actively negligent wrongdoer to one merely passively
negligent or to one not at all negligent but by statute or otherwise held vicari-
ously liable? Where the insured is the actively negligent wrongdoer or the one
solely responsible for the injury, if the insured's liability under an implied in
law indemnity obligation would be coextensive with the liability he has incurred
under his express contract of indemnity, then the exclusion clause should be
inoperative. The express indemnity agreement really adds nothing to the in-
demnitor's liability. Yet, though such a principle appears obvious, for it to
be a workable guide in determining the applicability of a contractual liability
5. Schwartz v. Merola Bros. Constr. Corp., 290 N.Y. 145, 43 N.E.2d 200 (1943) ; Thomp-
son-Starrett v. Otis Elevator Corp., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E2d 35 (1936); Dudar v. Milef,
258 N.Y. 415, 1SO N.E. 102 (1932).
6. Scott v. Curtis, 195 N.Y. 424, 88 N.E. 794 (1909) ; Phoenix Bridge Co. v. Creem, 102
App. Div. 354, 92 N.Y. Supp. S55 (2d Dep't 1905).
7. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Bege, 304 N.Y. 314, 323, 330, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471,
472 (1952). " ... Whether negligence is passive or active is% generally speaking, a question
of fact for the jury.
"The evidence ... shows that the Belgian Line was guilty of a fault of omim-ion whereas
Transoceanic, in negligently handling the drums, and Dow, in supplying inadequate drums,
were guilty of faults of commission. . . . While that is not always determinative, since
either a fault of omission or one of commission may constitute active negligence, it seems
to us that the factual disparity between the delinquency of Transoceanic and Dow and
that of Belgian Line is so great here that the jury was justified in concluding that Belgian
Line's fault of omission was only passive negligence."
For a comprehensive analysis of the effect of this decision see Note, Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors in New York, 39 Cornell L.Q. 484, 497 (1954).
S. See St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 236 Mo. App. 413, 154 S.W.2d
782 (1941); Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 213 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1951).
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exclusion clause, the insured must as a practical matter establish his implied
in law indemnity obligation in the course of the litigation.
In those decisions wherein the courts have recognized the distinctions to be
made in determining the applicability of a contractual liability exclusion clause,
this liability has been called one "imposed by law" as distinguished from one
"assumed by contract." Those terms are actual phrases used in typical policy
and indemnity agreements, and when viewed in their context the possibility for
ambiguity is lessened. However, since the phrase "liability imposed by law"
contains " . . . words of very broad significance and as used in their ordinary
sense, would include the total liability imposed by the law . . . "0 the more
appropriate phrase for the test of determining the application of a contractual
liability exclusion clause would seem to be, implied in law indemnity obligation.
THE CASES
The case that has come closest to formalizing the question, what was the
insured's implied in law indemnity obligation, while at the same time making an
analysis of the cases determining the effect of contractual liability exclusion
clauses, is United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Virginia Engineering Co.10
The defendant, Fidelity, issued a general liability policy to the Engineering Com-
pany which contained a contractual liability exclusion clause. The Engineering
Company's construction contract with International Harvester contained a lim-
ited indemnity provision. An employee of a contractor engaged by Harvester was
injured when he brushed against exposed high voltage wires being installed by
the Engineering Company and the employee recovered a judgment against both
the Engineering Company and Harvester. The recovery against Harvester was
sustained on the theory that Harvester owed the nondelegable duty to the
injured, who was an invitee on its premises, of maintaining proper preventive
measures against the danger of high voltage current." Harvester paid the
judgment and deducted the amount from money owed the Engineering Com-
pany under the construction contract. In the cited case the insured was suing
on its policy to recover the amount of the judgment. The court in granting
recovery stated:
"The indemnity clause in the construction contract did not assume liability with
respect to any claim for which the Engineering Company would not itself be liable
at law, but merely undertook to protect the Harvester Company against liability for
which the Engineering Company was responsible. To construe the exclusion clause
to relieve the Guaranty Company of liability for such claims would be to write into
the policy a restriction which it does not contain, and which, we think, could not
have been within the contemplation of the parties. It is not reasonable to suppose
that, when the insured was taking insurance to protect against liability imposed by law,
it was intended to exclude coverage of claims for which the law imposed liability on
9. Green Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ocean Acc. & Guaranty Co., 287 N.Y. 309, 315, 39 N.E.2d
251, 254 (1943).
10. 213 F.2d 109 (4th Cir. 1954).
11. See International Harvester Co. v. Sartain, 32 Tenn. App. 425, 222 S.W.2d 854
(1948).
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the insured, merely because insured had agreed to protect another against secondary
liability on account of such claims.""-
The Fidelity case did recognize the distinction in the types of indemnity
agreements and concluded that in effect the insured was liable for the judgment
in the personal injury action regardless of the indemnity agreement. The
court also placed due emphasis on what the parties intended when the policy
was taken out. Thus, on a contractual basis it was possible to justify the non-
application of the exclusion clause, where there was merely an implied in law
indemnity obligation, by stating that there was no intention on the part of the
insurer and the insured to exclude coverage in such a situation.
In Union Paving Co. v. Thomasla the opposite result was reached and the
court held that the exclusion clause was operative. However, the case is dis-
tinguishable from the Fidelity case. Thomas entered into a limited indemnity
agreement with the Paving Company and Thomas had a general liability insur-
ance policy containing a contractual liability exclusion clause. One Downey was
injured when his car crashed into an unlighted barrier where Thomas was
performing part of the street repairing for the Paving Company. Downey sued
and recovered from the Paving Company, in which suit the latter was deter-
mined to have breached a nondelegable duty it owed the public on the high-
ways and could not defend on the ground that its independent contractor,
Thomas, who was not a party to the suit, had been negligent."' The foundation
of the Paving Company's suit against Thomas was the indemnity agreement,
there being no claim made that Thomas had been negligent or that the Paving
Company had been merely passively negligent. The court denied Thomas' effort
to join the insurance company as a third party defendant holding that the terms
of the policy explicitly excluded a liability based on an assumption of liability
by contract.
The Fidelity case distinguished the Union Paving case on the basis that the
court " . . . seems to have proceeded on the theory that the only liability of
the insured for the injury ... arose out of the indemnity agreement which it
had executed. Here.. there was liability of the insured ... without reference
to the indemnity agreement.15 Had the implied in law indemnity obligation, if
there was one, been determined, then the case might have had a different result.
If Thomas had been brought in as a defendant in Downey's action then the
passive-active negligence rule might have been applied and Thomas deemed
liable for the full amount of the judgment as an active wrongdoer, or at least
as a tortfeasor jointly liable with the Paving Company. In such a case Thomas,
if found to be actively negligent and the Paving Company merely passively
negligent, would have incurred a liability arising out of an implied in law
indemnity obligation and the exclusion clause could have in theory been held
to have had no effect. In the indemnity suit by the Paving Company, had the
court recognized the possibility of the insured being liable without reference
12. 213 F.2d at 112.
13. 186 F.2d 172 (3rd Cir. 1951).
14. Downey v. Union Paving Co., 184 F2d 481 (1949).
15. 213 F.2d at 115.
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to the indemnity agreement, then the insurer could have been properly joined
as a third party defendant.
Another case where a contractual liability exclusion clause was held to pre-
clude recovery because the insured had contracted to indemnify a third party
was St. Louis Police Relief Ass'n v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.' The Association had
rented a coliseum for a benefit circus and had agreed to indemnify the lessor
for any liability incurred in relation to the premises during the term of the lease.
The Association then took out a liability policy with the defendant containing a
contractual liability exclusion clause. A spectator at the circus was injured when
a bottle cap caught in her heel and she slipped and fell down a flight of stairs.
Action was instituted against the lessor (on the theory that it had been negli-
gent in failing to comply with a municipal ordinance requiring handrails) and
against the lessee. The insurance companies of the lessor and lessee settled
with the injured spectator. The lessor recovered the amount of its settlement
from the Association. However, when the Association sued its insurance
carrier the court held that the terms of the policy were applicable because
the settlement of the lessor, which was based on the lessor's statutory negli-
gence, was in no way based on a negligent act of the Association, and, therefore,
was "the liability of another assumed by contract."'
7
Both the Fidelity and the Union Paving cases relied on the Association case
and the reasons why each found that case applicable are consistent. The
Fidelity case found that the Missouri decision did not deal with a liability im-
posed by law upon the Association, i.e., there was no implied in law obligation
upon the lessee to indemnify the lessor for the loss it had suffered by reason
of the ordinance violation.' 8 The Paving Company case emphasized that the
explicit character of the language in the policy when considered with the nature
of the liability suffered by the lessor operated to exclude coverage.' 9
In Board of Trade Livery Co. v. Georgia Cas. Co.,20 the Livery Company
had contracted to transport passengers of a steamship company while they
stopped over in Duluth. Under a city ordinance the Livery Company was re-
quired to have liability insurance. Its policy with the defendant excluded cover-
age for liability of others assumed by contract. The Livery Company reim-
bursed the steamship company for a judgment the latter had paid to persons
who had been injured in one of the Livery Company's vehicles. The court in
granting recovery to the insured on the policy stated:
"In reimbursing the Navigation Company . . . plaintiff was making good its own
liability and its own wrong, and not a primary liability or wrong of the Navigation
Company. . . . The case is analogous to those where one of two joint tort-feasors
may compel indemnity from the other. That is allowed . . . where, as between
themselves, only one is at fault, and his wrongful act or omission is a breach of a
duty owed to the other, and the primary cause of the injury."2 1
16. 236 Mo. App. 413, 154 S.W.2d 782 (1941).
17. Id. at 416, 154 S.W.2d at 790.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. 186 F.2d at 175.
20. 160 Minn. 490, 200 N.W. 633 (1924).
21. Id. at 491, 200 N.W. at 636.
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The Livery Company case, though it did not hold the exclusion clause in-
operative in a situation where an express indemnity contract had been involved,
does indicate what should be the effect of such a clause where the insured's
liability is one resulting from an implied in law indemnity obligation. The
Fidelity case cited the Livery Company case as being analogous to its situation
in that the obligation incurred by the Livery Company was one imposed by
law, i.e., an implied in law indemnity obligation.-' The Association case, in
noting that the liability of the Association was different in that it had been
assumed by contract, stated that "when the livery company paid the judgment,
it was making good its own wrong. It suffered a loss due to its own primary
negligence."23 These three cases may be summarized by stating that where the
implied in law indemnity obligation of the insured has been established, a con-
tractual liability exclusion clause will be inoperative whether the insured en-
tered into an indemnity agreement or not.
The most recent case holding a contractual liability clause inoperative is
O'Dowd v. American Surety Co.2-1 The plaintiff was injured on the premises
of a housing project being constructed by the insured for the Housing Authority
of the City of New York. The policy of the insured contained a contractual
liability exclusion clause. The insured and the Housing Authority were
charged with active and passive negligence respectively and the Housing Au-
thority cross-claimed against the insured on the theory that the insured was
solely responsible for the injury and that since the insured had agreed to in-
demnify it against claims for personal injury, insured should pay the entire
amount. The verdict was against both defendants and judgment was ordered
over against the insured. The court denied the insurer's plea that it was liable
under the rule of contribution25 for only one half the judgment and held the ex-
clusion clause inoperative. Though the O'Dowd case did not make it clear
whether a limited or sweeping indemnity agreement was involved, it held that
where the liability of the insured is attributable to his active negligence in
relation to the indemnitee's passive negligence, an exclusion clause can not
have the effect of prohibiting recovery. The court stated, "if the insurer's con-
tention were to be upheld its consequences would be to relieve the active
wrongdoer of a burden it has always bome and to place upon the passive wrong-
doer a burden it has never had.120
CONCLUSION
To obviate the difficulties presented by a contractual liability exclusion
clause, it is necessary that the principle be kept in mind that on the basis of
the passive-active negligence rule a person may be held liable in the absence
22. 213 F.2d at 113.
23. 236 Mo. App. at 416, 154 S.W.2d at 790.
24. 135 N.Y.LJ. No. 81, p. 7, col. S (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 26, 1956), ald, 2 A.2d
956 (1st Dep't 1956).
25. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 211-a.
26. 135 N..L. ". No. 81, p. 8, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 26, 1956), art'd, 2 A.D2d
956 (1st Dep't 1956).
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